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Monotonic allocation schemes in clan games

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Author Info
Voorneveld, M.
Tijs, S.
Grahn, S. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Abstract

Total clan games are characterized using monotonicity, veto power of the clan members, and a concavity condition reflecting the decreasing marginal contribution of non-clan members to growing coalitions. This decreasing marginal contribution is incorporated in the notion of a bi-monotonic allocation scheme, where the value of each coalition is divided over its members in such a way that the clan members receive a higher, and the non-clan members a lower share as the coalitions grow larger. Each core element of a total clan game can be extended to both a population monotonic and a bi-monotonic allocation scheme. In total clan games where the clan consists of a single member (the so-called big boss) the use of the nucleolus as an allocation mechanism gives rise to a bi-monotonic allocation scheme.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 80.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200080

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  1. Branzei, R. & Scotti, F. & Tijs, S. & Torre, A., 2002. "Discretization of information collecting situations and continuity of compensation rules," Discussion Paper 18, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Alparslan-Gok, S.Z. & Branzei, R. & Tijs, S.H., 2008. "Big Boss Interval Games," Discussion Paper 2008-47, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  3. Tijs, S. & Branzei, R. & Solymosi, T., 2003. "Type monotonic allocation schemes for multi-glove games," Discussion Paper 34, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  4. Branzei, Rodica & Dimitrov, Dinko & Tijs, Stef, 2006. "Convex games versus clan games," Discussion Paper 58, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Tijs, Stef & Moretti, Stefano & Branzei, Rodica & Norde, Henk, 2005. "The Bird core for minimum cost spanning tree problems revisited: monotonicity and additivity aspects," Discussion Paper 3, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Josep Maria Izquierdo Aznar, 2003. "Regular Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes and the Core," Working Papers in Economics 110, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia. [Downloadable!]
  7. Tijs, S. & Branzei, R. & Muto, S. & Ishihara, S. & Fukuda, E., 2002. "Fuzzy clan games and bi-monotonic allocation rules," Discussion Paper 115, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. Moretti, S. & Norde, H. & Pham Do, K.H., 2001. "Connection problems in mountains and monotonic allocation schemes," Discussion Paper 12, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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