In the games with population uncertainty introduced in this paper, the number and identity of the participating players are determined by chance. Games with population uncertainty are shown to include Poisson games and random-player games. The paper focuses on those strategy profiles that are most likely to yield a Nash equilibrium in the game selected by chance. Existence of maximum likelihood equilibria is established under mild topological conditions.
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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number
79.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Roger B. Myerson, 1997.
"Large Poisson Games,"
Discussion Papers
1189, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Igal Milchtaich, 1997.
"Random-Player Games,"
Discussion Papers
1178, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]