Ecological systems such as shallow lakes are usually non-linear and display discontinuities and hysteresis in their behaviour. These systems often also provide conflicting services as a resource and a waste sink. This implies that the economic analysis of these systems requires to solve a non-standard optimal control problem or, in case of a common property resource, a non-standard differential game. This paper provides the optimal management solution and the open-loop Nash equilibrium for a dynamic economic analysis of the model for a shallow lake. It also investigates whether it is possible to induce optimal management in case of common use of the lake, by means of a tax. Furthermore, an interesting property for the feedback Nash equilibrium is derived.
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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number
69.
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Article
Karl-Göran Mäler & Anastasios Xepapadeas & Aart de Zeeuw, 2003.
"The Economics of Shallow Lakes,"
Environmental & Resource Economics,
European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 26(4), pages 603-624, December.
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Brock, William A. & de Zeeuw, Aart, 2002.
"The repeated lake game,"
Economics Letters,
Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 109-114, June.
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