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Cooperative Games arising from Information Sharing Situations

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  • Brânzei, R.
  • Tijs, S.H.
  • Timmer, J.B.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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    Abstract

    Relations are established between information sharing (IS) situations and IS-games on one hand and information collecting (IC) situations and IC-games on the other hand. It is shown that IC-games can be obtained as convex combinations of so-called local games. Properties are described which IC-games possess if all related local games have the respective properties. Special attention is paid to the classes of convex IC-games and of k-concave IC-games. This last class turns out to consist of total big boss games. For the class of total big boss games a new solution concept is introduced: bi-monotonic allocation schemes.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2000-42.

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    Date of creation: 2000
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    Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200042

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    Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

    Related research

    Keywords: cooperative games; information; big boss games; bi-monotonic allocation scheme;

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    References

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    1. Sprumont, Yves, 1990. "Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 378-394, December.
    2. Brânzei, R. & Tijs, S.H. & Timmer, J.B., 2000. "Collecting Information to improve Decision-Making," Discussion Paper 2000-26, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Slikker, M. & Norde, H.W. & Tijs, S.H., 2003. "Information sharing games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-117078, Tilburg University.
    4. Muto, S. & Nakayama, M. & Potters, J.A.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1988. "On big boss games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154246, Tilburg University.
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    Cited by:
    1. Moretti, S. & Norde, H.W. & Pham Do, K.H. & Tijs, S.H., 2001. "Connection Problems in Mountains and Monotonic Allocation Schemes," Discussion Paper 2001-12, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Tijs, S.H. & Timmer, J.B. & Brânzei, R., 2001. "Compensations in Information Collecting Situations," Discussion Paper 2001-2, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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