References listed on IDEAS
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1. Schwartz, Alan., 1984. "Products Liability, Corporate Structure and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship," Working Papers 542, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
2. Boyd, James & Ingberman, Daniel E, 1997. "The Search for Deep Pockets: Is "Extended Liability" Expensive Liability?," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(1), pages 232-58, April.
3. Diamond, Douglas W, 1991. "Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 689-721, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Innes, Robert, 1999. "Optimal liability with stochastic harms, judgement-proof injurers, and asymmetric information1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 181-203, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Boyer, Marcel & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997. "Environmental risks and bank liability," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(8), pages 1427-1459, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Boyer, M. & Laffont, J.J., 1995. "Environmental Risks and Bank Liability," Cahiers de recherche 9501, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
   • Boyer, M. & Laffont, J.J., 1995. "Environmental Risks and Bank Liability," Cahiers de recherche 9501, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
   • BOYER, Marcel & LAFFONT, Jean-Jacques, 1994. "Environmental Risks and Bank Liability," IDEI Working Papers 45, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
   • Marcel Boyer & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1994. "Environmental Risks and Bank Liability," CIRANO Working Papers 94s-22, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
6. Chemmanur, Thomas J & Fulghieri, Paolo, 1994. "Reputation, Renegotiation, and the Choice between Bank Loans and Publicly Traded Debt," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 7(3), pages 475-506. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Chemmanur, T.J. & Fulghieri, P., 1992. "Reputation, Renegotiation, and the Choice Between Bank Loans and Publicity Traded Debt," Papers 92-24, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.
7. Eberhard Feess & Ulrich Hege, 2000. "Environmental Harm and Financial Responsibility*," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 25(2), pages 220-234, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Ringleb, Al H & Wiggins, Steven N, 1990. "Liability and Large-Scale, Long-term Hazards," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(3), pages 574-95, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Heyes, Anthony G, 1996. "Lender Penalty for Environmental Damage and the Equilibrium Cost of Capital," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 63(250), pages 311-23, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Wiggins, Steven N & Ringleb, Al H, 1992. "Adverse Selection and Long-Term Hazards: The Choice between Contract and Mandatory Liability Rules," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 189-215, January.
11. Kornhauser, Lewis A & Revesz, Richard L, 1990. "Apportioning Damages among Potentially Insolvent Actors," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 617-51, June.
12. Jost, Peter-J., 1996. "Limited liability and the requirement to purchase insurance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 259-276, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. T. Randolph Beard, 1990. "Bankruptcy and Care Choice," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(4), pages 626-634, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Posey, Lisa Lipowski, 1993. "Limited liability and incentives when firms can inflict damages greater than net worth," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 325-330, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1996. "Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 1-25, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Eberhard Feess, 1999. "Lender Liability for Environmental Harm: An Argument Against Negligence Based Rules," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 231-250, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Demougin, Dominique & Fluet, Claude, 1999. "A further justification for the negligence rule," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 33-45, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1998. "A Further Justification for the Negligence Rule," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9801, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
18. Gompers, Paul & Lerner, Josh, 1999. "An analysis of compensation in the U.S. venture capital partnership1," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 3-44, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1992. " Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1367-400, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Polborn, Mattias K., 1998. "Mandatory insurance and the judgment-proof problem," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-146, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1999. "Using decoupling and deep pockets to mitigate judgment-proof problems1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 275-293, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
22. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 1998. "Bankers on boards: monitoring, financing, and lender liability," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Sep.
23. Balkenborg, D., 1997. "Bargaining Power and the Impact of Lender Liability for Environmental Damages," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9709, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Carsten Helm, 2005. "How Liable should an Exporter be? The Case of Trade in Hazardous Goods," Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 153, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (Department of Economics), Technische Universität Darmstadt (Darmstadt University of Technology). [Downloadable!]
2. Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2007. "Sharing Liability Between Banks and Firms: The Case of Industrial Safety Risk," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-04, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
3. Carsten Helm & Anja Schöttner, 2005. "Subsidizing Technological Innovations in the Presence of R&D Spillovers," Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 154, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (Department of Economics), Technische Universität Darmstadt (Darmstadt University of Technology). [Downloadable!]
4. Juan José Ganuza & Fernando Gómez, 2003. "Optimal Negligence Rule under Limited Liability," Economics Working Papers 759, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised May 2004. [Downloadable!]