The Political Feasibility of Increasing Retirement Age: Lessons from a Ballot on Female Retirement Age
AbstractIn 1998, the Swiss voters approved of an increase in female retirement age from 62 to 64.The referendum, being on a single issue only, offers a unique opportunity to explore the political feasibility of pension reforms and to apply theoretical models of life-cycle decision making.Estimates carried out with municipality data suggest that the outcome of the vote conforms relatively well with predictions drawn from a theoretical simulation study.There are, however, surprising gender differences even in married couples.Young agents, married middle-aged and all elderly men favor an increase in female retirement age, while middle-aged and elderly women strongly oppose it.Richer communities and those with a high proportion of self-employed or a low fraction of blue-collar workers are more likely to opt for a higher retirement age.Ideological preferences and regional differences also play a considerable role.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2000-121.
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
retirement; female workers; decision making;
Other versions of this item:
- Monika BÜTLER, 2000. "The Political Feasibility of Increasing Retirement Age: Lessons from a Ballot on Female Retirement Age," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du DÃ©partement d'EconomÃ©trie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 00.27, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Bütler, Monika, 2001. "The Political Feasibility of Increasing Retirement Age: Lessons from a Ballot on Female Retirement Age," CEPR Discussion Papers 2780, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
- D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy
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