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Tree-connected Peer Group Situations and Peer Group Games

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Author Info

  • Brânzei, R.
  • Fragnelli, V.
  • Tijs, S.H.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

Abstract

A class of cooperative games is introduced which arises from situations in which a set of agents is hierarchically structured and where potential individual economic abilities interfere with the behavioristic rules induced by the organization structure.These games form a cone generated by a specific class of unanimity games, namely those based on coalitions called peer groups. Different economic situations like auctions, communication situations, sequencing situations and flow situations are related to peer group games.For peer group games classical solution concepts have nice properties.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2000-117.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2000117

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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

Related research

Keywords: auctions; cooperative games; peer groups;

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References

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  1. Borm, P.E.M. & Nouweland, C.G.A.M. van den & Tijs, S.H., 1994. "Cooperation and communication restrictions: A survey," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154189, Tilburg University.
  2. Gilles, R.P. & Owen, G. & Brink, J.R. van den, 1991. "Games with permission structures: The conjunctive approach," Discussion Paper 1991-14, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Roger B. Myerson, 1976. "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Discussion Papers 246, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Jean Derks & Hans Haller & Hans Peters, 2000. "The selectope for cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 23-38.
  5. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules," Discussion Papers 363, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Pradeep Dubey & Robert J. Weber, 1977. "Probabilistic Values for Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 471, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. Arin, J. & Feltkamp, V., 1994. "The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games," Discussion Paper 1994-40, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  8. Ehud Kalai & Eitan Zemel, 1980. "On Totally Balanced Games and Games of Flow," Discussion Papers 413, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Wernz, Christian & Deshmukh, Abhijit, 2012. "Unifying temporal and organizational scales in multiscale decision-making," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 223(3), pages 739-751.
  2. René Brink & Gerard Laan & Vitaly Pruzhansky, 2011. "Harsanyi power solutions for graph-restricted games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 87-110, February.
  3. Rodica Brânzei & Tamás Solymosi & Stef Tijs, 2005. "Strongly essential coalitions and the nucleolus of peer group games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 447-460, 09.
  4. René van den Brink, 2003. "Axiomatizations of Permission Values for Games with a Hierarchical Permission Structure using Split Neutrality," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-100/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  5. Brink J.R. van den & Talman A.J.J. & Herings P.J.J. & Laan G. van der, 2013. "The average tree permission value for games with a permission tree," Research Memorandum 001, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
  6. Ren� van den Brink & Enrique Gonz�lez-Aranguena & Conrado Manuel & M�nica del Pozo, 2013. "Order Monotonic Solutions for Generalized Characteristic Functions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-093/II, Tinbergen Institute.
  7. René van den Brink, 2004. "Null or Zero Players: The Difference between the Shapley Value and the Egalitarian Solution," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-127/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  8. René Brink, 2008. "Vertical wage differences in hierarchically structured firms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 225-243, February.
  9. Balazs Sziklai & Tamas Fleiner & Tamas Solymosi, 2013. "The Nucleolus of Directed Acyclic Graph Games," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1321, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  10. E. Algaba & J. M. Bilbao & R. van den Brink & A. Jiménez-Losada, 2003. "Axiomatizations of the Shapley value for cooperative games on antimatroids," Computational Statistics, Springer, vol. 57(1), pages 49-65, 04.
  11. Rene van den Brink & Chris Dietz, 2012. "Games with a Local Permission Structure: Separation of Authority and Value Generation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-126/II, Tinbergen Institute.
  12. Kuipers, Jeroen & Mosquera, Manuel A. & Zarzuelo, José M., 2013. "Sharing costs in highways: A game theoretic approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 228(1), pages 158-168.
  13. Rene van den Brink & Chris Dietz, 2012. "Games with a Local Permission Structure: Separation of Authority and Value Generation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-126/II, Tinbergen Institute.

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