Club Efficiency and Lindahl Equilibrium with Semi-Public Goods
AbstractLimit core allocations are the ones that remain in the core of a replicated economy. An equivalent notion for economies with public goods is Schweizer's club efficiency. We extend this notion to economies with goods that have a semi-public nature. The notion encompasses purely private as well as purely public club goods as polar cases. We show that given certain conditions the equivalence of club efficient allocations and Lindahl equilibria holds for a wide range of economies with semi-public club goods. We also show that extension to a more general class of economies seems implausible.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 2000-08.
Date of creation: 2000
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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
clubs; club efficiency; Lindahl equilibrium; limit cores;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- R51 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Finance in Urban and Rural Economies
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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