Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Voluntary Contribution to Multiple Public Projects

Contents:

Author Info

  • Koster, M.A.L.
  • Reijnierse, J.H.
  • Voorneveld, M.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

Abstract

The problem of financing a set of public goods (facilities, projects) by private contri- butions is studied. The corresponding cooperative game, the realization game, is shown to be convex. For the noncooperative setting we study a realization scheme that induces a strategic game. This contribution game is shown to be best-response equivalent with a coordination game in which the payoff to all players is the utilitarian collective welfare function, i.e., the sum of the utility functions of the players. Several equilibrium proper- ties are derived: no money is wasted in an equilibrium; a player whose necessary projects are not all realized does not contribute. Strategy profiles maximizing utilitarian welfare are strong Nash equilibria of the contribution game. Each strong Nash equilibrium corre- sponds to a core element of the realization game in a natural way. It is shown that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of strong Nash equilibria of the contribution game and the largest set of core elements of the realization game, that is consistent with maximizing the number of players with non-zero payoffs. It is precisely the subset of the core according to which rewards zero indicate null players

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=3952
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Richard Broekman)
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 1999-88.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:199988

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

Related research

Keywords: public goods; cooperative games; coordination games; potential games; utili- tarian welfare function;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Voorneveld, M. & Norde, H.W., 1997. "A characterisation of ordinal potential games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-74020, Tilburg University.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Tercieux, Olivier & Voorneveld, Mark, 2005. "The cutting power of preparation," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 583, Stockholm School of Economics.
  2. Olivier Tercieux & Mark Voorneveld, 2010. "The cutting power of preparation," Computational Statistics, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 85-101, February.
  3. Kuipers, Jeroen & Mosquera, Manuel A. & Zarzuelo, José M., 2013. "Sharing costs in highways: A game theoretic approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 228(1), pages 158-168.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:199988. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Richard Broekman).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.