Broek, W.A. van den (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
Abstract
We consider a continuous time system influenced by different agents who adopt moving horizon control. The well known Nash equilibrium concept is used to define two solution concepts fitting in the moving horizon structure. One of them is analyzed in more detail in the class of linear quadratic games. The (dis)advantages of moving horizon control are illustrated by means of a government debt stabilization model.
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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number
7.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - General E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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