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Noncooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel

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Author Info
Montero, M. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Abstract

This paper studies non-cooperative bargaining with random proposers in apex games. Two different protocols are considered: the egalitarian propocol, which selects each player to be the proposer with the same probability, and the proportional protocol, which selects each player with a probability proportional to his number of votes. Expected equilibrium payoffs coincide with the kernel for the grand coalition regardless of the protocol. Expected payoffs conditional on a coalition may depend on the protocol: given a coalition of the apex player with a minor player, an egalitarian protocol yields a nearly equal split whereas a proportional protocol leads to a proportional split.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 61.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:199961

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Okada, Akira, 1996. "A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 97-108, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 1993. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 60(2), pages 463-77, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Bennett, E. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Demand Commitment Bargaining: -The Case Of Apex Games," Papers 9062, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  6. Bennett, Elaine, 1997. "Multilateral Bargaining Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 151-179, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Montero, M., 2002. "Two-stage bargaining with reversible coalitions : the case of apex games," Discussion Paper 26, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Cecilia Testa, 2003. "Government Corruption and Legislative Procedures: is One Chamber Better Than Two?," STICERD - Development Economics Papers 41, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  3. Klaus Abbink, 2006. "Majority rip-off in referendum voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 1-21, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003," Working Papers 2004-20, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Montero, M., 2001. "The nucleolus as a consistent power index in noncooperative majority games," Discussion Paper 39, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. G Frechette & J Kagel & M Morelli, 2004. "Behavioral Identification in Coalition Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000006, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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