On Evolutionary Stability of Spiteful Preferences
AbstractThe paper analyzes under what conditions spiteful preferences are evolutionarily stable applying the indirect evolution approach. With a quadratic material payo¤ function, spiteful preferences are evolutionarily stable for a large set of parameters. It is shown that strategic substitutability or complementarity is endogenous property of the game played with evolutionarily stable preferences. Its relation to properties of the material payoff function is analyzed. Finally, it is shown that with incomplete information only selfish preferences are evolutionarily stable.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 1999-56.
Date of creation: 1999
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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
indirect evolution; spite; endogenous preferences;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-07-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-1999-07-28 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-1999-07-28 (Game Theory)
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