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On Evolutionary Stability of Spiteful Preferences

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  • Possajennikov, A.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

Abstract

The paper analyzes under what conditions spiteful preferences are evolutionarily stable applying the indirect evolution approach. With a quadratic material payo¤ function, spiteful preferences are evolutionarily stable for a large set of parameters. It is shown that strategic substitutability or complementarity is endogenous property of the game played with evolutionarily stable preferences. Its relation to properties of the material payoff function is analyzed. Finally, it is shown that with incomplete information only selfish preferences are evolutionarily stable.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 1999-56.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:199956

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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

Related research

Keywords: indirect evolution; spite; endogenous preferences;

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References

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  1. repec:wop:humbsf:1997-28 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Bester, H. & Güth, W., 1994. "Is altruism evolutionarily stable ?," Discussion Paper 1994-103, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
  4. Dufwenberg, Martin & Güth, Werner, 1998. "Indirect Evolution versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions," Working Paper Series 1998:9, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  5. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
  6. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, December.
  7. Jeffrey C. Ely & Okan Yilankaya, 1997. "Nash Equilibrium and the Evolution of Preferences," Discussion Papers 1191, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. W. Güth & B. Peleg, 1997. "When will the fittest survive? -An indirect evolutionary analysis-," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1997,71, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  9. Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
  10. Levent Kockesen & Efe A. Ok & Rajiv Sethi, 1997. "On the Strategic Advantage of Negatively Interdependent Preferences," Game Theory and Information 9708001, EconWPA, revised 08 Aug 1997.
  11. Dufwenberg, Martin & Güth, Werner, 1997. "Indirect evolution versus strategic delegation: A comparison of two approaches to explaining economic institutions," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1997,28, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  12. Armen A. Alchian, 1950. "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 211.
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Cited by:
  1. César A.Salazar & Mauricio G.Villena, 2005. "Evolución de preferencias bajo escenarios de información completa e incompleta: teoría y evidencia experimental," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 32(2 Year 20), pages 159-186, December.

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