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When does international capital mobility require tax coordination?

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Author Info
Rodrik, D.
Ypersele, T. van (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Abstract

Basic economic theory identifies a number of efficiency gains that derive from international capital mobility. But just as with free trade in goods, there is no guarantee that capital mobility makes everyone better off. Consequently, capital mobility may be politically unsustainable even though it enhances efficiency. This paper discusses how such a dilemma might arise, and suggests that international tax coordination might serve as a way out under some circumstances.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 27.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:199927

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1992. "The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(4), pages 689-701, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1995. "Double-Edged Incentives: Institutions and Policy Coordination," CEPR Discussion Papers 1141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Maurice Obstfeld, 1995. "Risk-Taking, Global Diversification, and Growth," NBER Working Papers 4093, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Razin, A. & Sadka, E., 1991. "International Fiscal Policy Coordination and Competition," Papers 3-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
  5. Dani Rodrik, 1998. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(5), pages 997-1032, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, 1995. "International Fiscal Policy Coordination and Competition: An Exposition," NBER Working Papers 3779, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Gordon, Roger H, 1992. " Can Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(3), pages 1159-80, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Garrett, Geoffrey, 1995. "Capital Mobility, Trade, and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 49(4), pages 657-87, Autumn.
  9. Garrett, Geoffrey, 1995. "Capital mobility, trade, and the domestic politics of economic policy," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(04), pages 657-687, September. [Downloadable!]
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  1. Thierry Warin & André Fourçans, 2006. "Can Tax Competition Lead to a Race to the Bottom in Europe? A Skeptical View," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0604, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jeffrey Carpenter & Stephen Burks & Lorenz Götte, 2006. "Performance Pay and the Erosion of Worker Cooperation: Field experimental evidence," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0603, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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