On the Viability of Gift Exchange in a Market Environment
AbstractIs gift-exchange inevitably to be crowded out by impersonal market exchange? The presence of a thick-market externality indicates that this is indeed likely to be the case. But reciprocity or gift-exchange induces social relations. The utility function is extended in order to take account of social relations in the form of symbolic utility or moral sentiments. As long as moral sentiments are valued high enough it is shown that both market and gift-exchange can coexist. The spontaneous order need not necessarily select the most efficient market size however.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 1999-113.
Date of creation: 1999
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exchange; reciprocity; gifts; moral and extended preferences;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- E11 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Marxian; Sraffian; Institutional; Evolutionary
- L17 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Open Source Products and Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-12-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-1999-12-21 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-MIC-1999-12-21 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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