Neighbour Games and the Leximax Solution
Abstract
Neighbour games arise from certain matching or sequencing situations in which only some specific pairs of players can obtain a positive gain. As a consequence, the class of neighbour games is the intersection of the class of assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1972)) and the class of component additive games (Curiel et al. (1994)). We first present some elementary features of neighbour games. After that we provide a polynomially bounded algorithm of order p3 for calculating the leximax solution (cf. Arin and IËœnarra (1997)) of neighbour games, where p is the number of players.Download Info
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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 1999-110.Length:
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:1999110
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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Klijn, Flip & Vermeulen, Dries & Hamers, Herbert & Solymosi, Tamas & Tijs, Stef, 2003. "Neighbor games and the leximax solution," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-3972, Maastricht University.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-12-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-1999-12-21 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IND-1999-12-21 (Industrial Organization)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Arin, J. & Inarra, E., 1997. "Consistency and Egalitarianism: The Egalitarian Set," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica 163, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists).
- Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H. & Vermeulen, D., 1999.
"On the Nucleolus of Neighbour Games,"
Discussion Paper
1999-111, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Hamers, Herbert & Klijn, Flip & Solymosi, Tamas & Tijs, Stef & Vermeulen, Dries, 2003. "On the nucleolus of neighbor games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 1-18, April.
- Hamers, Herbert & Klijn, Flip & Solymosi, Tamas & Tijs, Stef & Vermeulen, Dries, 2003. "On the nucleolus of neighbor games," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-3951, Maastricht University.
- Arin, Javier & Kuipers, Jeroen & Vermeulen, Dries, 2008.
"An axiomatic approach to egalitarianism in TU-games,"
Open Access publications from Maastricht University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-23090, Maastricht University.
- Javier Arin & Jeroen Kuipers & Dries Vermeulen, 2008. "An axiomatic approach to egalitarianism in TU-games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 37(4), pages 565-580, December.
- Curiel, I. & Potters, J.A.M. & Rajendra Prasad, V. & Tijs, S.H. & Veltman, B., 1994. "Sequencing and cooperation," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154192, Tilburg University.
- Moulin,Hervi, 1991. "Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521424585.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Hamers, Herbert & Klijn, Flip & Solymosi, Tamas & Tijs, Stef & Vermeulen, Dries, 2003.
"On the nucleolus of neighbor games,"
European Journal of Operational Research,
Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 1-18, April.
- Hamers, H.J.M. & Klijn, F. & Solymosi, T. & Tijs, S.H. & Vermeulen, D., 1999. "On the Nucleolus of Neighbour Games," Discussion Paper 1999-111, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Hamers, Herbert & Klijn, Flip & Solymosi, Tamas & Tijs, Stef & Vermeulen, Dries, 2003. "On the nucleolus of neighbor games," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-3951, Maastricht University.
- Velzen, S. van & Hamers, H.J.M. & Solymosi, T., 2004.
"Core Stability in Chain-Component Additive Games,"
Discussion Paper
2004-101, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- van Velzen, Bas & Hamers, Herbert & Solymosi, Tamas, 2008. "Core stability in chain-component additive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 116-139, January.
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