This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Neigbour games and the leximax solution

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Klijn, F.
Vermeulen, D.
Hamers, H. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Neighbour games arise from certain matching or sequencing situations in which only some specific pairs of players can obtain a positive gain. As a consequence, the class of neighbour games is the intersection of the class of assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1972)) and the class of component additive games (Curiel et al. (1994)). We first present some elementary features of neighbour games. After that we provide a polynomially bounded algorithm of order p 3 for calculating the leximax solution (cf. Arin and Inarra (1997)) of neighbour games, where p is the number of players.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=3997
File Format: application/postscript
File Function:
Download Restriction: no
File URL: http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=3996
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 110.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:1999110

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Corry Stuyts).

Related research
Keywords:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Arin, J. & Inarra, E., 1997. "Consistency and Egalitarianism: The Egalitarian Set," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica 163, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists).
  2. Hamers, H. & Klijn, F. & Solymosi, T., 1999. "On the nucleolus of neighbour games," Discussion Paper 111, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Hamers, H. & Klijn, F. & Solymosi, T., 1999. "On the nucleolus of neighbour games," Discussion Paper 111, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? There is a FAQ (frequently asked questions).

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.