Weighted Constrained Egalitarianism in TU-Games
AbstractThe constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) for TU-games is extended to asymmetric cases, using the notion of weight systems as in Kalai and Samet (1987,1988). This weighted constrained egalitarian solution is based on the weighted Lorenz-criterion as an inequality measure. It is shown that in general there is at most one such weighted egalitarian solution for TU-games. Existence is proved for the class of convex games. Furthermore, the core of a postive valued convex game is covered by weighted constrained egalitarian solutions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 1999-107.
Date of creation: 1999
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Cooperative game theory; inequality; egalitarianism; Lorenz-ordering; core;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-12-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-1999-12-01 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-IND-1999-12-01 (Industrial Organization)
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