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Weighted Constrained Egalitarianism in TU-Games

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  • Koster, M.A.L.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

Abstract

The constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) for TU-games is extended to asymmetric cases, using the notion of weight systems as in Kalai and Samet (1987,1988). This weighted constrained egalitarian solution is based on the weighted Lorenz-criterion as an inequality measure. It is shown that in general there is at most one such weighted egalitarian solution for TU-games. Existence is proved for the class of convex games. Furthermore, the core of a postive valued convex game is covered by weighted constrained egalitarian solutions.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 1999-107.

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Date of creation: 1999
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:1999107

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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

Related research

Keywords: Cooperative game theory; inequality; egalitarianism; Lorenz-ordering; core;

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References

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  1. Arin, J. & Inarra, E., 1997. "Consistency and Egalitarianism: The Egalitarian Set," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica 163, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists).
  2. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "A Concept of Egalitarianism under Participation Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 615-35, May.
  3. Dutta, B, 1990. "The Egalitarian Solution and Reduced Game Properties in Convex Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 153-69.
  4. Javier Arin & Jeroen Kuipers & Dries Vermeulen, 2008. "An axiomatic approach to egalitarianism in TU-games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 37(4), pages 565-580, December.
  5. Koster, M.A.L. & Molina, E. & Sprumont, Y. & Tijs, S.H., 2001. "Sharing the cost of a network: Core and core allocations," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-91407, Tilburg University.
  6. Jean-Yves Jaffray & Philippe Mongin, 2003. "Constrained egalitarianism in a simple redistributive model," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 33-56, February.
  7. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1973. "Some further results on the measurement of inequality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 188-204, April.
  8. Sen, Amartya, 1997. "On Economic Inequality," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198292975, October.
  9. Tijs, S.H. & Koster, M.A.L., 1996. "General Aggregation of Demand and Cost Sharing Methods," Discussion Paper 1996-87, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  10. Koster, M.A.L. & Molina, E. & Sprumont, Y. & Tijs, S.H., 1998. "Core Representations of the Standard Fixed Tree Game," Discussion Paper 1998-21, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  11. Dasgupta, Partha & Sen, Amartya & Starrett, David, 1973. "Notes on the measurement of inequality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 180-187, April.
  12. Ebert, Udo, 1997. "Social Welfare When Needs Differ: An Axiomatic Approach," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(254), pages 233-44, May.
  13. Udo Ebert, 1999. "Using equivalent income of equivalent adults to rank income distributions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 233-258.
  14. Monderer, Dov & Samet, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S, 1992. "Weighted Values and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 27-39.
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Cited by:
  1. Bjorndal, E. & Koster, M.A.L. & Tijs, S.H., 2004. "Weighted allocation rules for standard fixed tree games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-142601, Tilburg University.

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