Governance of Clubs and Firms with Cultural Dimensions
AbstractThe neoclassical way to cope with firms providing services, or with clubs procuring services, is restricted by the lack of institutional features. An institutional approach is introduced that requires a cooperative governance to realize the potential value-production by firms, or to realize the potential user-value by clubs. For each, a distinctive governance system is introduced. The firm requires an implementation governance to activate the value-production capacities of its service providers. It is empowered top-down by the unique top- position of the organization. The club, on the other hand, requires a representation governance to aggregate the user-values of its members for some common service and to order this service. It is empowered bottom-up by the service-users, i.e., the members of the club using that common service. Institutional characteristics are also re ected in the distribution functions that are used inrewarding positions in firms and clubs. Some cultural dimensions are expressed in these distribution functions. That allows us to relate characteristics of governance systems to society's cultural dimensions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 1999-101.
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
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Governance; service economy; cooperative organization; club; firm; values; culture;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-11-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-1999-11-28 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-IND-1999-11-28 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-1999-11-28 (Microeconomics)
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