Counter Intuitive Results in a Simple Model of Wage Negotiations
AbstractShort-term contracts and exogenous productivity growth are introduced in a simple wage bargaining model. The equilibrium utilities corresponding to militant union behaviour are independent of the contract length. Necessary and sufficient conditions for monotonic convergence to a unique steady state are derived. Otherwise, cyclic behaviour of wage shares is inevitable. A wage decrease can occur if strike is credible, but never when strike is not credible. In the limit, as time between bargaining rounds vanishes, this paradox survives.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 1998-92.
Date of creation: 1998
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wage bargaining; wage dynamics; chaos; strike;
Other versions of this item:
- Harold Houba & Gijsbert van Lomwel, 2001. "Counter intuitive results in a simple model of wage negotiations," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 81-99.
- Harold Houba & Gijsbert van Lomwel, 1998. "Counter Intuitive Results in a Simple Model of Wage Negotiations," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 98-115/3, Tinbergen Institute.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1998-11-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-LTV-1998-12-30 (Unemployment, Inequality & Poverty)
- NEP-MIC-1998-11-20 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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