In this paper we analyse the effects of ageing in a small open economy with a representative government. More specific, we adress the question whether in case of ageing a transition from an unfunded to a more funded pension scheme is politically feasible. We show that the existence of a suitable subsidy on savings is crucial in this respect. Without a subsidy on savings, the economy is trapped at the preexisting level of saving and ageing leads to an increase of the PAYG tax. However, if a subsidy exists which is linked to the tax rate in a non-linear way a conversion from PAYG to funded pensions is politically feasible.
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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number
90.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
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