The Structure of the Set of Equilibria for Two Person Multicriteria Games
AbstractIn this paper the structure of the set of equilibria for two person multicriteria games is analysed. It turns out that the classical result for the set of equilibria for bimatrix games, that it is a finite union of polytopes, is only valid for multicriteria games if one of the players only has two pure strategies. A full polyhedral description of these polytopes can be derived when the player with an arbitrary number of pure strategies has one criterion.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 1998-75.
Date of creation: 1998
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game theory; equilibrium theory;
Other versions of this item:
- Borm, Peter & Vermeulen, Dries & Voorneveld, Mark, 2003. "The structure of the set of equilibria for two person multicriteria games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 480-493, August.
- Borm, P.E.M. & Vermeulen, D. & Voorneveld, M., 2003. "The structure of the set of equilibria for two person multicriteria games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-117079, Tilburg University.
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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