Evolution of Thoughts: Deductive Game Theories in the Inductive Game Situation. Part I
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 1998-59.
Date of creation: 1998
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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
Other versions of this item:
- Kaneko, M., 1998. "Evolution of Thoughts: Deductive Game Theories in the Inductive Game Situation. Part II," Discussion Paper 1998-60, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- NEP-ALL-1999-09-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-1999-09-17 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HIS-1999-09-09 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-IND-1999-09-09 (Industrial Organization)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kaneko, Mamoru & Nagashima, Takashi, 1991. "Final decisions, the Nash equilibrium and solvability in games with common knowledge of logical abilities," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 229-255, December.
- Kaneko, Mamoru, 1999. "Epistemic considerations of decision making in games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 105-137, September.
- Kaneko, Mamoru & Matsui, Akihiko, 1999. " Inductive Game Theory: Discrimination and Prejudices," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 101-37.
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