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Accountability of central banks : aspects and quantification

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Author Info
Haan, J. de
Amtenbrink, F.
Eijffinger, S.C.W. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Abstract

This paper starts with a discussion of the various aspects of accountability of central banks. On the basis of this discussion we construct an indicator for accountability for 16 central banks, including the European Central Bank. It is shown that the degree of accountability differs considerably and that the ECB has a rather low score. The indicator is used to examine the relationship between central bank independence and account-ability. It is concluded that although there appears to be a negative relationship between independence and accountability, this does certainly not imply that a central bank cannot both be independent and accountable.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 54.

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Date of creation: 1998
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:199854

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Related research
Keywords: accountability;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bennett T. McCallum, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Svensson, Lars E O, 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Charles Nolan & Eric Schaling, . "Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Central Bank Accountability," Bank of England working papers 54, Bank of England.
  4. Muscatelli, Anton, 1998. "Optimal Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences: Accountability through Independence?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 529-42, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Forder, James, 1996. "On the Assessment and Implementation of 'Institutional' Remedies," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(1), pages 39-51, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Eijffinger, S. & van Keulen, M., 1994. "Central Bank Independence in Another Eleven Countries," Papers 9494, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  8. Adam S. Posen, 1995. "Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 253-274 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Marco Lossani & Piergiovanna Natale & Patrizio Tirelli, 1997. "Do we really need to tame a conservative ECB? When the policy mix matters," Working Papers 18, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 1998. [Downloadable!]
  2. Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W. & Hoeberichts, Marco M., 2000. "Central Bank accountability and transparency : theory and some evidence," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2000,06, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Pierre L. Siklos, 2003. "Assessing the Impact of Changes in Transparency and Accountability at the Bank of Canada," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 29(3), pages 279-299, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi & Daniel Gros, 2001. "Is the ECB Sufficiently Accountable and Transparent?," Economics Working Papers 007, European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes. [Downloadable!]
  5. Francisco Torres, 2003. "EMU and EU Governance," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 03, Departamento de Economia, Gestão e Engenharia Industrial, Universidade de Aveiro, revised Oct 2003. [Downloadable!]
  6. Svensson, Lars, 1999. "Monetary Policy Issues for the Eurosystem," Seminar Papers 667, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Marcel Peter & Geoffrey Heenan & Scott Roger, 2006. "Implementing Inflation Targeting: Institutional Arrangements, Target Design, and Communications," IMF Working Papers 06/278, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  8. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Hoeberichts, Marco & Schaling, Eric, 2000. "A Theory of Central Bank Accountability," CEPR Discussion Papers 2354, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Alessandro Gambini & Marco Arnone & Salim M. Darbar, 2007. "Banking Supervision: Quality and Governance," IMF Working Papers 07/82, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  10. Marco Lossani & Piergiovanna Natale & Patrizio Tirelli, 2000. "A Nominal Income Growth Target for a Conservative ECB? When the policy mix matters," Working Papers 32, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2000. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Jan Libich, 2006. "An Explicit Inflation Target As A Commitment Device," CAMA Working Papers 2006-22, Australian National University, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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