Learning in sender-receiver games
AbstractStimulus-response (SR) and belief-based learning (BBL) models are estimated with experimental data from sender-receiver games and compared using the Davidson and MacKinnon P-test for non-nested hypotheses. Depending on a certain adjustment parameter, the P-test favors the SR model, the BBL model or neither of the models. Following Camerer and Ho, the models are also compared to a hybrid model that incorporates a mixture of both types of learning. The hybrid model is frequently not significantly better than either the SR or the BBL model. The sensitivity of the results to observations taken after learning has ceased is investigated.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 1998-28.
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
game theory; learning; testing;
Other versions of this item:
- Blume, A. & DeJong, D.V. & Neumann, G.R. & Savin, N.E., 1998. "Learning in Sender-Receiver Games," Working Papers 98-02, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Andreas Blume & Douglas V. DeJong & George R. Neumann & Nathan E. Savin, 1998. "Learning in Sender-Receiver Games," CIG Working Papers FS IV 98-13, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- DeJong, D.V. & Blume, A. & Neumann, G., 1998. "Learning in Sender-Receiver Games," Discussion Paper 1998-028, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
- C13 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Estimation: General
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