In this note we study the endogenous formation of cooperation structures. According to several equilibrium concepts the full cooperation structure will form or some structure that is payoff-equivalent to the full cooperation structure. As a by-product we find a class of games in strategic form where several equilibrium concepts coincide.
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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number
20.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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