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Sophisticated players and sophisticated agents

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Author Info
Rustichini, A. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
Abstract

A sophisticated player is an individual who takes the action of the opponents, in a strategic situation, as determined by decision of rational opponents, and acts accordingly. A sophisticated agent is rational in the choice of his action, but ignores the fact that he is part of a strategic situation. We discuss a notion of equilibrium with sophisticated agents, we provide conditions for its existence, and argue that it differs systematically from the Nash equilibrium.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 110.

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Date of creation: 1998
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:1998110

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Arthur, W Brian, 1993. "On Designing Economic Agents That Behave Like Human Agents," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-22, February.
  2. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Sarin, Rajiv & Vahid, Farshid, 1999. "Payoff Assessments without Probabilities: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 294-309, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play," Levine's Working Paper Archive 470, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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