This paper discusses environmental policy instruments in a differential-game model of international trade with oligopolistic competition. Strategic interactions occur if firms use feedback strategies and therefore react on decisions of their com-petitor. Eventually this harms firm profits, because all firms act strategically. A firm reacts differently if its competitor is subject to an environmental standard than if it is subject to an environmental tax. Under open-loop investment strategies and feedback strategies of energy use, environmental taxes always give rise to more investment for strategic reasons than standards. This confirms results of multistage static models of the same problem. The new result is that under feedback investment strategies the reverse can be the case.
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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number
43.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games D92 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
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