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Campaign expenditures, contributions and direct endorsements : the strategic use of information and money to influence voter behavior

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Author Info
Potters, J.
Sloof, R.
Winden, F. van (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Abstract

A costly signaling model is presented in which we show how campaign expenditures can buy votes. The model shows that the amount of campaign expenditures may convey the electorate information about the candidate s intended policy. When this model is extended to allow for a contributing interest group, it appears that for campaigning to be informative it is sometimes crucial that campaign funds are supplied by informed third parties. The extension also provides an explanation why interest groups contribute to the candidate s campaign, rather than using direct endorsements; they may need the candidate as an intermediary to filter their opposing interests.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 27.

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Date of creation: 1997
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:199727

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Cho, In-Koo & Sobel, Joel, 1990. "Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 381-413, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Baron, David P, 1989. "Service-Induced Campaign Contributions and the Electoral Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(1), pages 45-72, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Kihlstrom, Richard E & Riordan, Michael H, 1984. "Advertising as a Signal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(3), pages 427-50, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Grofman, Bernard & Norrander, Barbara, 1990. " Efficient Use of Reference Group Cues in a Single Dimension," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(3), pages 213-27, March.
  6. Lupia, Arthur, 1994. " The Effect of Information on Voting Behavior and Electoral Outcomes: An Experimental Study of Direct Legislation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(1), pages 65-86, January.
  7. Lupia, Arthur & McCubbins, Mathew D, 1994. "Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 96-125, April.
  8. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Helsley, Robert W. & O'Sullivan, Arthur, 1994. "Altruistic voting and campaign contributions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 107-119, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Snyder, James M, 1989. "Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 637-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Banks, Jeffrey S., 1990. "A model of electoral competition with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 309-325, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Williams, Kenneth C, 1994. " Spatial Elections with Endorsements and Uninformed Voters: Some Laboratory Experiments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 80(1-2), pages 1-8, July.
  14. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1992. " Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 269-92, October.
  15. Chappell, Henry W, Jr, 1982. "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: A Simultaneous Probit-Tobit Model," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 64(1), pages 77-83, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Chappell, Henry W, Jr, 1994. " Campaign Advertising and Political Ambiguity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 281-303, June.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Christoph Vanberg, 2005. "“One Man, One Dollar”? Examining the equalization argument in support of campaign contribution limits," Public Economics 0512001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Prat, Andrea, 1999. "Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers 2152, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Prat, A., 1998. "Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies," Discussion Paper 123, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  4. Andrea Prat & Riccardo Puglisi & James Snyder, 2005. "Is Private Campaign Finance a Good Thing? Estimates of the Potential Informational Benefits," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000960, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
  5. Stephen Coate, 2003. "Power-hungry Candidates, Policy Favors, and Pareto Improving Campaign Finance Policy," NBER Working Papers 9601, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Reuben E., 2002. "Interest groups and politics: The need to concentrate on group formation," Public Economics 0212001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  7. Thomas Stratmann, 2003. "Tainted Money? Contribution Limits and the Effectiveness of Campaign Spending," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  8. Stephen Coate, 2001. "Political Competition with Campaign Contributions and Informative Advertising," NBER Working Papers 8693, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Börner, Kira, 2004. "Political Economy Reasons for Government Inertia: The Role of Interest Groups in the Case of Access to Medicines," Discussion Papers in Economics 313, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Stephen Coate, 2004. "Pareto-Improving Campaign Finance Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 628-655, June. [Downloadable!]
  11. Elena Panova, 2007. "Congruence Among Voters and Contributions to Political Campaigns," Cahiers de recherche 0722, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
  12. Filip Palda, 2002. "Campaign Finance: An Introduction to the Field," Public Economics 0209005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  13. Arye Hillman & Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 2000. "Protection, Lobbying, and Market Structure," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-12, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Westermark, Andreas, 2001. "Campaigning and Ambiguity when Parties Cannot Make Credible Election Promises," Working Paper Series 568, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Madani, Dorsati & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 2002. "Politically optimal tariffs : an application to Egypt," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2882, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  16. Prat, A., 1997. "Campaign advertising and voter welfare," Discussion Paper 118, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  17. Daniel Houser & Thomas Stratmann, 2006. "Selling Favors in the Lab: Experiments on Campaign Finance Reform," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. David Yi, 2007. "Election campaign resource allocation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 91-105, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Christian Schultz, 2003. "Strategic Campaigns and Redistributive Politics," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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