Long Term Debt and the Political Support for a Monetary Union
AbstractThis paper examines the role of long term debt for the political support of a monetary union or, more generally, an inflation-reduction policy. The central idea is that the decision about membership in the union leads to a redistribution between debtors and creditors, if they are holding long term debt with a nominally fixed interest rate, as well as tax payers. For example, if joining the union means a decrease in the inflation rate, creditors should favor joining while debtors should be against it. A government of a high inflation country might strategically try to exploit this effect by selling more long term debt denominated in its own currency at a fixed nominal rate rather than a foreign currency such as the Dollar (or, almost equivalently, as floating-rate debt or rolled-over short-term debt) to its citizens. We show that the effect on political support is unclear. While the "creditor effect" of increasing the number of agents holding domestically denominated debt helps generating support for joining the union, the "tax effect" of having to raise more taxes in order to pay for the increased real debt payments after a successful monetary union works in the opposite way. The paper then studies a number of special cases and ramifications. The case of Italy is examined more closely. The paper argues that recent debt management policy in Italy is probable to have eroded the political support for actions aimed at enhancing EMU membership chances
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 1997-13.
Date of creation: 1997
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monetary integration; national debt; monetary policy; inflation;
Other versions of this item:
- Uhlig, Harald, 1997. "Long Term Debt and the Political Support of a Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 1603, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
- E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
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