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General aggregation of demand and cost sharing methods

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Author Info
Tijs, S.
Koster, M. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 87.

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Date of creation: 1996
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:199687

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Keywords: cost sharing;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. O'Neill, Barry, 1982. "A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 345-371, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Moulin Herve & Shenker Scott, 1994. "Average Cost Pricing versus Serial Cost Sharing: An Axiomatic Comparison," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 178-201, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Moulin, Herve, 1995. "On Additive Methods to Share Joint Costs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 98-99, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Dagan, Nir & Volij, Oscar, 1993. "The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative bargaining approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 287-297, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Young, H.P., 1994. "Cost allocation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 34, pages 1193-1235 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Littlechild, Stephen C, 1975. "Common Costs, Fixed Charges, Clubs and Games," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(1), pages 117-24, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  9. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Koster, Maurice & Tijs, Stef & Borm, Peter, 1998. "Serial cost sharing methods for multi-commodity situations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 229-242, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. S.C. Littlechild & G.F. Thompson, 1977. "Aircraft Landing Fees: A Game Theory Approach," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(1), pages 186-204, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Martin Shubik, 1961. "Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 112, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Koster, M., 1998. "Multi-service serial cost sharing : a characterization of the Moulin-Shenker rule," Discussion Paper 6, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Moulin, Herve, 2001. "Axiomatic Cost and Surplis-Sharing," Working Papers 2001-06, Rice University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Justin Leroux, 2006. "A discussion of the consistency axiom in cost-allocation problems," Cahiers de recherche 06-13, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée. [Downloadable!]
  4. Koster, M., 1998. "Multi-service serial cost sharing : an incompatibility with smoothness," Discussion Paper 122, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  5. Koster, M., 2005. "Sharing Variable Returns of Cooperation," CeNDEF Working Papers 05-06, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
  6. Koster, M., 1999. "Weighted constrained egalitarianism in tu-games," Discussion Paper 107, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  7. Branzei.R., & Ferrari, G. & Fragnelli, V. & Tijs, S., 2001. "Two approaches to the problem of sharing delay costs in joint projects," Discussion Paper 22, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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