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Optimal enforcement policies (crackdown) on a drug market

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Author Info
Kort, P.M
Feichtinger, G.
Hartl, R.F.
Haunschmied, J. L. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Abstract

In this paper an optimal control model is presented to design enforcement programs minimizing the social costs from both the market and crackdown. By using the maximum principle we show that performing an enforcement policy that leads to a collapse of the drug market is more likely to be optimal when the sales volume depends on the number of dealers. In case of a buyer's market the optimal enforcement policy leads to a saddle point equilibrium where the enforcement rate is fixed such that the number of dealers is kept constant at a positive level.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 29.

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Date of creation: 1996
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:199629

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Related research
Keywords: drug market;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Baveja, Alok & Batta, Rajan & Caulkins, Jonathan P. & Karwan, Mark H., 1993. "Modeling the response of illicit drug markets to local enforcement," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 73-89, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Skiba, A K, 1978. "Optimal Growth with a Convex-Concave Production Function," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(3), pages 527-39, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Baveja, A. & Feichtinger, G. & Hartl, R.F., 1999. "A resource-constrained optimal control model for crackdown on illicit drug markets," Discussion Paper 85, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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