Bolton, P. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
Abstract
This paper extends the classic two-armed bandit problem to a many-agent setting in which I players each face the same experi- mentation problem. The main change from the single-agent prob- lem is that an agent can now learn from the current experimentation of other agents. Information is therefore a public good, and a free- rider problem in experimentation naturally arises. More interestingly, the prospect of future experimentation by others encourages agents to increase current experimentation, in order to bring forward the time at which the extra information generated by such experimenta- tion becomes available. The paper provides an analysis of the set of stationary Markov equilibria in terms of the free-rider e ect and the encouragement e ect. The paper is a revision of our earlier paper, Bolton and Harris [7]. The main modi cation concerns the formulation of randomization in continuous time. C.f. Harris [12]. The earlier paper explored one formulation based on the idea of rapid alternation over the state space. The current paper explores a formulation which is the closest analogue of the discrete-time formulation. It is based on the idea of randomization at each instant of time.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number
27.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Corry Stuyts).
Related research
Keywords:
Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Mirman, L.J. & Samuelson, L. & Urbano, A., 1989.
"Duopoly Signal Jamming,"
Papers
8-89-8, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
Other versions: