Intrafirm Information Transfer and Wages
AbstractTechnical and other information may be a firm s most important asset.To benefit from its information, however, a firm has to reveal it to one or more employees.Better informed employees produce more, but at the same time they demand higher wages to prevent them from joining a business competitor or starting their own firm.This paper examines the strategic transfer of information by a firm to its employees over their employment lifes.Generally, the firm is shown to transfer additional information to its employees each period of the employment relationship, while wages rise accordingly.An implication of the model is that more senior workers are more productive and receive higher wages because they have better access to the firm s vital informati-on.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 1996-18.
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
business information; employees; wages; management science;
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