A class of non cooperative games characterized by a `congestion e ect' is studied, in which there exists a strong Nash equilibrium, and the set of Nash equilibria, the set of strong Nash equilibria and the set of strategy pro les maximizing the potential function coincide. The structure of the class is investigated and it turns out that this class constitutes a cone. Remarks on strictly strong Nash equilibria and relaxations are provided.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number
13.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Corry Stuyts).
Related research
Keywords:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: