Protective Behavior in Games
AbstractThis paper introduces the notion of protective equilibrium in the context of fin ite games in strategic form.It shows that for matrix games the set of protective equilibria equals the set of proper equilibria.Moreover, in the context of bima trix games, the notion of protective behaviour is used as a refinement tool.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 1996-12.
Date of creation: 1996
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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
game theory; strategy;
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295, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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- Vermeulen, A.J. & Jansen, M.J.M, 1994. "On the set of (perfect) equilibria of a bimatrix game," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-3810, Maastricht University.
- Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar, 1982. "Implementability via protective equilibria," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 49-65, June.
- Barbara, Salvador & Jackson, Matthew, 1988. "Maximin, leximin, and the protective criterion: Characterizations and comparisons," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 34-44, October.
- Vincent Merlin & Jörg Naeve, 2000. "Implementation of Social Choice Functions via Demanding Equilibria," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut fÃ¼r Volkswirtschaftslehre der UniversitÃ¤t Hohenheim 191/2000, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany, revised 25 Sep 2001.
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