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Monetary Union without Fiscal Coordination May Discipline Policymakers

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Author Info
Beetsma, R.
Bovenberg, L. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Abstract

We show that, with benevolent policymakers and fiscal leadership, monetary unification reduces inflation, taxes and public spending. These disciplining effects of a monetary union, which rise with the number of fiscal players in the union, are likely to raise welfare. Joining an optimally designed monetary union is particularly attractive if fiscal authorities do not care about inflation. Fiscal coordination offsets the disciplining effects of monetary unification. Hence, subsidiarity in fiscal policymaking may enhance welfare.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 59.

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Date of creation: 1995
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:199559

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

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  1. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Designing Fiscal and Monetary policy Institutions for a European Monetary Union," DELTA Working Papers 95-21, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  3. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Thomas Krichel & Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman, 1994. "Fiscal and Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union: Credible Inflation Targets or Monetised Debt?," Department of Economics Discussion Papers 9403, Department of Economics, University of Surrey. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1984. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Alesina, Alberto F & Grilli, Vittorio, 1993. "On the Feasibility of a One- or Multi-Speed European Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 792, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Beetsma, R. & Bovenberg, L., 1995. "Designing Fiscal and Monetary Institutions for a European Monetary Union," Discussion Paper 58, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Joshua Aizenman, 1990. "Soft Budget Constraints, Taxes, and the Incentive to Cooperate," NBER Working Papers 3561, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 1997. "Designing fiscal and monetary institutions in a second-best world," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 53-79, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Levine, Paul L & Pearlman, Joseph, 1992. "Fiscal and Monetary Policy Under EMU: Credible Inflation Targets or Unpleasant Monetary Arithmetic?," CEPR Discussion Papers 701, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 94-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
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  12. Levine, Paul, 1993. "Fiscal Policy Co-ordination under EMU and the Choice of Monetary Instrument," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(0), pages 1-12, Suppl..
  13. Bayoumi, Tamim, 1994. "A Formal Model of Optimum Currency Areas," CEPR Discussion Papers 968, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Aizenman, Joshua, 1992. "Competitive Externalities and the Optimal Seigniorage," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 24(1), pages 61-71, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Alessandra Casella, 1990. "Participation in a Currency Union," NBER Working Papers 3220, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Casella, Alessandra, 1990. "Participation in a Currency Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 395, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Guy Debelle, 1996. "Central Bank Independence: A Free Lunch?," IMF Working Papers 96/1, International Monetary Fund.
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