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On te generic stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests

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Author Info
Bhaskar, V. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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Abstract

Although a mixed strategy can never be evolutionarily stable in a truly asymmetric contest, examples show that mixed strategies can satisfy the weaker criterion on neutral stability. This paper shows that such examples are rare, and, generically, a mixed strategy is unstable. We apply the result to the battle of sexes between males and females over the raising of offspring.

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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 30.

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Date of creation: 1995
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:199530

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  1. Selten, Reinhard, 1988. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 223-266, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1990. "Evolutionary Stability In Repeated Games Played By Finite Automata," Working papers 90-29, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
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  3. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1990. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 274-79, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Karl H. Schlag, 1994. "When Does Evolution Lead to Efficiency in Communication Games?," Discussion Paper Serie B 299, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Joel Sobel, 1993. "Evolutionary Stability and Efficiency," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 93-17, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
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  7. Bhaskar, V., 1998. "Noisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 110-131, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Selten, Reinhard, 1983. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 269-363, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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