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A perfectness concept for multicriteria games

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Author Info

  • Megen, F. van
  • Borm, P.E.M.
  • Tijs, S.H.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

Abstract

This paper considers a refinement of equilibria for multicriteria games based on the perfectness concept of Selten (1975). Existence of perfect equilibrium points is shown and several characterizations are provided. Furthermore, contrary to the result for equilibria for multicriteria games, an example shows that there is no exact correspondence between perfect equilibrium points and the perfect Nash equilibria of the related trade-of games.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 1995-28.

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Date of creation: 1995
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:199528

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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

Related research

Keywords: Game Theory; game theory;

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References

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  1. Borm, P.E.M. & Tijs, S.H. & Aarssen, J.C.M. van den, 1988. "Pareto equilibria in multiobjective games," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-146611, Tilburg University.
  2. E. Kohlberg & J.-F. Mertens, 1998. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 445, David K. Levine.
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Cited by:
  1. L. Petrosjan & J. Puerto, 2002. "Folk theorems in multicriteria repeated N-person games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 275-287, December.
  2. Quant, M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Fiestras-Janeiro, G. & Megen, F.J.C. van, 2004. "On Properness and Protectiveness in Two Person Multicriteria Games," Discussion Paper 2004-127, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  3. Giuseppe De Marco & Jacqueline Morgan, 2009. "On Multicriteria Games with Uncountable Sets of Equilibria," CSEF Working Papers 242, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  4. Giuseppe De Marco & Jacqueline Morgan, 2009. "Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution Equilibria," CSEF Working Papers 235, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.

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