Otten, G.J. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
Abstract
Decomposable effectivity functions are introduced as an extension of additive effectivity functions. Whereas additive effectivity functions are determined by pairs of additive TU-games, decomposable effectivity functions are generated by pairs of TU-games that need not be additive. It turns out that the class of decomposable effectivity functions does not only contain the class of additive effectivity functions but it also contains the class of effectivity functions corresponding to simple games and the class of effectivity functions corresponding to veto functions. We examine relations between properties of decomposable effectivity functions and the TU-games by which they are generated. It turns out that a decomposable effectivity function is stable whenever it can be generated by a pair of balanced TU-utility games. Finally, we provide two characterizations of decomposable effectivity functions.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number
26.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Moulin, Herve, 1994.
"Social choice,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,
in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 31, pages 1091-1125
Elsevier.
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