We experimentally investigate the development of voluntary transfers in an overlapping generations environment. By varying the information conditions of the game, we study whether the development of transfers is related to the possibility of future generations to monitor and reciprocate transfers of past generations. The results display a fairly high level of voluntary transfers across generations, even when players are experienced. Furthermore, the level of transfers does not seem to depend much on the possibility of monitoring. Weak signs of cross-generational reciprocity are observed. Apparently, the public-good features of the experiment dominate the possibilities for intertemporal rewarding and punishing
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Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number
110.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
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