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Central bank independence: A paneldata approach

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Author Info

  • Eijffinger, S.C.W.
  • Rooij, M. van
  • Schaling, E.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

Abstract

The present paper uses a panel-data estimation technique to combine the time series for individual countries--Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. The authors postulated the response of central banks in these countries to inflation, economic growth, and current account surplus given the constraints to be the same among the sample countries. Differences between central bank independence come forward in a different structural pressure to lower or raise money market rates in these countries. The empirical results in this study coincide remarkably well with the legal indices of central bank independence. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 1994-93.

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Date of creation: 1994
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Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:199493

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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

Related research

Keywords: Central Banks; Panel Data;

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References

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  1. Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1993. "Central bank independence in twelve industrial countries," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-152908, Tilburg University.
  2. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
  3. Francesco Giavazzi & Marco Pagano, 1991. "The Advantage of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility," NBER Chapters, in: International Volatility and Economic Growth: The First Ten Years of The International Seminar on Macroeconomics, pages 303-330 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. International Monetary Fund, 1991. "Central Bank Independence," IMF Working Papers 91/58, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1992. "Central bank independence: Criteria and indices," Research Memorandum 548, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
  6. Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Macroeconomics and Politics," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, pages 13-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. D. Backus & J. Driffil, 1998. "Inflation and Reputation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625, David K. Levine.
  8. Schaling, E. & Smyth, D., 1994. "The effects of inflation on growth and fluctuations in dynamic macroeconomic models," Discussion Paper 1994-39, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  9. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
  10. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  11. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1993. "Central bank independence: Theory and evidence (Revised version)," Discussion Paper 1993-25, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  12. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, December.
  13. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
  14. Taylor, John B., 1983. "`Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy' by Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 123-125.
  15. Driffill, John & Mizon, Grayham Ernest & Ulph, Alistair Mitchell, 1989. "Costs of Inflation," CEPR Discussion Papers 293, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Driffill, John & Mizon, Grayham E. & Ulph, Alistair, 1990. "Costs of inflation," Handbook of Monetary Economics, in: B. M. Friedman & F. H. Hahn (ed.), Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 19, pages 1013-1066 Elsevier.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Siklos, Pierre L., 2008. "No single definition of central bank independence is right for all countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 802-816, December.
  2. Helge Berger & Ulrich Woitek, . "Does Conservatism Matter? A Time Series Approach to Central Banking," Working Papers 9814, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, revised May 1999.
  3. Helmut Wagner & Wolfram Berger, 2004. "Globalization, Financial Volatility and Monetary Policy," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 163-184, June.
  4. Krause, Stefan & Méndez, Fabio, 2008. "Institutions, arrangements and preferences for inflation stability: Evidence and lessons from a panel data analysis," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 282-307, March.
  5. Mark Mietzner & Dirk Schiereck, 2011. "Staatsfonds als Ankerinvestoren: Eine Note zum Einstieg von Aabar bei Daimler," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(1), pages 92-100, 02.
  6. H.M. Prast, 1996. "Inflation, unemployment and the position of the central bank: the opinion of the public," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 49(199), pages 415-454.
  7. Lemmen, J.J.G. & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1996. "The Fundamental Determinants of Financial Integration in the European Union," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73027, Tilburg University.
  8. Helmut Wagner, 2000. "Controlling inflation in transition economies: The relevance of central bank independence and the right nominal anchor," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 28(1), pages 60-70, March.
  9. Tonny Lybek, 1999. "Central Bank Autonomy, and Inflation and Output Performance in the Baltic States, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union, 1995-1997," IMF Working Papers 99/4, International Monetary Fund.
  10. Jakob Haan & Sander Oosterloo, 2006. "Transparency and accountability of central banks in their role of financial stability supervisor in OECD countries," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 255-271, November.
  11. Kai Hielscher & Gunther Markwardt, 2011. "The Role of Political Institutions for the Effectiveness of Central Bank Independence," CESifo Working Paper Series 3396, CESifo Group Munich.
  12. Athanasios Anastasiou, 2009. "Central Bank Independence and Economic Performance," Cyprus Economic Policy Review, University of Cyprus, Economics Research Centre, vol. 3(1), pages 123-156, June.
  13. H.M. Prast, 1996. "Inflation, unemployment and the position of the central bank: the opinion of the public," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 49(199), pages 415-454.
  14. Harold Brumm & Richard Krashevski, 2003. "The Sacrifice Ratio and Central Bank Independence Revisited," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 157-168, April.
  15. Lilia Cavallari, 2001. "Macroeconomic Performance and Wage Bargaining in a Monetary Union," Empirica, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 419-433, December.
  16. Price, Simon, 1997. " Political Business Cycles and Macroeconomic Credibility: A Survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 92(3-4), pages 407-27, September.
  17. Walsh, Carl-E, 1997. "Inflation and Central Bank Independence: Is Japan Really an Outlier?," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 15(1), pages 89-117, May.
  18. Stefan Krause & Felix Rioja, 2006. "Financial Development and Monetary Policy Efficiency," Emory Economics 0613, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta).
  19. Berlemann, Michael & Hilscher, Kai, 2010. "Effective monetary policy conservatism: A comparison of 11 OECD countries," HWWI Research Papers 2-21, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).

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