Games with imperfectly observable commitment
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 1994-64.
Date of creation: 1994
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- V. Bhaskar & Eric van Damme, 1998.
"Moral Hazard and Private Monitoring,"
Game Theory and Information
- Bhaskar, V. & Damme, E.E.C. van, 2002. "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-88790, Tilburg University.
- Damme, E.E.C. van & Bhaskar, V., 1997. "Moral hazard and private monitoring," Discussion Paper 1997-98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Jorg Oechssler & Karl Schlag, 1997. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell's Example," Game Theory and Information 9704001, EconWPA, revised 11 Apr 1997.
- Elmar Wolfstetter & Brigitte Adolph, 1997. "Chain Store Paradoxon," Microeconomics 9701005, EconWPA.
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