World Bank-borrower relations and project supervision
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 1994-14.
Date of creation: 1994
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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl
Developing Countries; World Bank;
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- Gauthier, B., 1990. "Agency Problems And Structural Arrangements Within International Economic Organizations: The Case Of The World Bank," Papers 143, Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy.
- Kilby, Christopher, 2000. "Supervision and performance: the case of World Bank projects," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 233-259, June.
- Singh, Nirvikar, 1985. "Monitoring and Hierarchies: The Marginal Value of Information in a Principal-Agent Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 599-609, June.
- Kilby, C., 1995. "Supervision and Performance : The Case of World Bank Projects," Discussion Paper 1995-45, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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