International aspects of pollution control
AbstractPollution is a by-product of production, is only gradually dissolved by the environment, and crosses national borders. The market outcome ignores the adverse effects of pollution and thus yields higher levels of output and pollution than would prevail under a supranational social planner which does care about pollution. In practice, governments often do not cooperate and this leads to outcomes of pollution and production in between the market outcomes and the outcomes under supra-national social planning. Absence of precommitment leads to lower emission charges, less cleaning-up activities and more pollution. Appropriate levels of emission charges under the various outcomes are a result of this analysis. Attention is also paid to investment in clean technology. The debate between optimists, who believe that higher production is compatible with sound environmental policy, and pessimists can be analysed in this way. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 1990-65.
Date of creation: 1990
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International Economics; Pollution;
Other versions of this item:
- Van Der Ploeg, F. & De Zeeuw, A.J., 1990. "International Aspects Of Pollution Control," Papers 9065, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Ploeg, F. van der & Zeeuw, A.J. de, 1992. "International aspects of pollution control," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-377516, Tilburg University.
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