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An "informationally robust equilibrium" for two-person nonzero-sum games

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Author Info

  • Robson, A.J.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

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File URL: http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=104950
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 1990-39.

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Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:199039

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Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

Related research

Keywords: Game Theory; Equilibrium Theory;

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References

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  1. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1991. "A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 237-243, May.
  2. Matsui, Akihiko, 1989. "Information leakage forces cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 94-115, March.
  3. Hellwig, Martin & Leininger, Wolfgang & Reny, Philip J. & Robson, Arthur J., 1990. "Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 406-422, December.
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Cited by:
  1. Reny, Phil & Robson, Arthur, 2004. "Reinterpreting Mixed Strategy Equilibria: A Unification of the Classical and Bayesian Views," Microeconomics.ca working papers robson-04-02-12-12-44-46, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 12 Feb 2004.
  2. Rabia Nessah & Guoqiang Tian, 2008. "The Existence of Equilibria in Discontinuous and Nonconvex Games," Working Papers 2008-ECO-14, IESEG School of Management, revised Mar 2010.
  3. Rabia Nessah & Guoqiang Tian, 2009. "Existence of Equilibria in Discontinuous and Nonconvex Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000206, David K. Levine.
  4. Nessah, Rabia & Tian, Guoqiang, 2008. "Existence of Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," MPRA Paper 41206, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2010.

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