Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Ownership structure and efficiency: An incentive mechanism approach

Contents:

Author Info

  • Zou, L.

    (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    No abstract is available for this item.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=104938
    Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Richard Broekman)
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research in its series Discussion Paper with number 1989-55.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: 1989
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:198955

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://center.uvt.nl

    Related research

    Keywords: Corporate Performance; Corporate Ownership;

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1984. "A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 329-369, December.
    2. Zou, L., 1989. "Threat-Based Incentive Mechanisms Under Moral Hazard And Adverse Selection," CORE Discussion Papers 1989009, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May.
    4. Oliver D. Hart, 1988. "Capital Structure as a Control Mechanism in Corporations," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 21(3), pages 467-76, August.
    5. Picard Pierre, 1986. "On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8602, CEPREMAP.
    6. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    7. John H. Boyd & Edward C. Prescott & Bruce D. Smith, 1988. "Organizations in economic analysis," Working Papers 385, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    8. Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    9. Forges, F., 1984. "An approach to communication equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 1984035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    10. Boardman, Anthony E & Vining, Aidan R, 1989. "Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 1-33, April.
    11. repec:fth:louvco:8909 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Roemer, John E. & Silvestre, Joaquim, 1992. "A welfare comparison of private and public monopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 67-81, June.
    13. Klein, Benjamin, 1983. "Contracting Costs and Residual Claims: The Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 367-74, June.
    14. Crawford, Vincent P, 1985. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules: A Reformulation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 817-35, July.
    15. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Multicontract Organization," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 21(3), pages 459-66, August.
    16. Furubotn, Eirik G, 1988. "Codetermination and the Modern Theory of the Firm: A Property-Rights Analysis," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(2), pages 165-81, April.
    17. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dgr:kubcen:198955. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Richard Broekman).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.