A design approach is offered for individual tariffs for mass customized mobile service products, whereby operators can determine their contract acceptance rules to guarantee with a set probability their minimum profit and risk levels. It uses realistic improvements to earlier reported negotiation algorithms [1], and a full operator operational model including infrastructure and content acquisition. Value at risk and profit are analyzed when a random user has consistent characteristics to a survey group, so that risk and profits are pooled. This analysis is necessary to give the supplier business guarantees to enter individual tariff agreements. A full numerical case is given for a class of mobile service.
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Paper provided by Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam. in its series Research Paper with number
ERS-2007-052-LIS Revision_Date: 2009-07-29.