This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Auctioning Bulk Mobile Messages

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Meij, S.
Pau, L-F.
Heck, H.W.G.M. van (Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), RSM Erasmus University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The search for enablers of continued growth of SMS traffic, as well as the take-off of the more diversified MMS message contents, open up for enterprises the potential of bulk use of mobile messaging , instead of essentially one-by-one use. In parallel, such enterprises or value added services needing mobile messaging in bulk - for spot use or for use over a prescribed period of time - want to minimize total acquisition costs, from a set of technically approved providers of messaging capacity. This leads naturally to the evaluation of auctioning for bulk SMS or MMS messaging capacity, with the intrinsic advantages therein such as reduction in acquisition costs, allocation efficiency, and optimality. The paper shows, with extensive results as evidence from simulations carried out in the Rotterdam School of Management e-Auction room, how multi-attribute reverse auctions perform for the enterprise-buyer, as well as for the messaging capacity-sellers. We compare 1- and 5-round auctions, to show the learning effect and the benefits thereof to the various parties. The sensitivity will be reported to changes in the enterprise's and the capacity providers utilities and priorities between message attributes (such as price, size, security, and delivery delay). At the organizational level, the paper also considers alternate organizational deployment schemes and properties for an off-line or spot bulk messaging capacity market, subject to technical and regulatory constraints.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1765/274
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam. in its series Research Paper with number ERS-2003-006-LIS Revision_Date: 2009-07-29.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 04 Mar 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dgr:eureri:2003284

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.erim.eur.nl/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (ERIM Series Handler at the ERIM Office).

Related research
Keywords: Mobile commerce; multi-attribute auctions; MMS; SMS; EMS;

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Cason, Timothy N. & Plott, Charles R., 1996. "EPA's New Emissions Trading Mechanism: A Laboratory Evaluation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 133-160, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Fernando Branco, 1997. "The Design of Multidimensional Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 63-81, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Grosof, Benjamin & Reeves, Daniel & Wellman, Michael, 2002. "Automated Negotiation from Declarative Contract Descriptions," Working papers 4188-01, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  5. Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1996. "Auctions versus Negotiations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 180-94, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Klemperer, P., 1999. "Auction Theory: a Guide to the Literature," Economics Papers 1999-w12, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    Other versions:
  7. Maria Angeles de Frutos & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1997. "On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-value Auctions," Papers 0077, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
    Other versions:
  8. Yeon-Koo Che, 1993. "Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(4), pages 668-680, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Chen, H. & Pau, L-F., 2004. "Individual Telecommunications Tariffs in Chinese Communities: History as a Mirror of the Future, and Relevance for Mobile Service Development in China," Research Paper ERS-2004-057-LIS Revision, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus Uni. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? There are NEP reports in over 80 fields that deliver new research to your email.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-18.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.