Hendrikse, G.W.J. Veerman, C.P. (Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), RSM Erasmus University)
Abstract
Two extensions are formulated of the analysis of the allocation of decision rights in Hendrikse and Veerman (2001). First, the incomplete contracts in their article can be viewed as simple long-term contracts, i.e. it is not allowed to make the allocation of authority contingent on the circumstances. Contingent long-term contracts are now considered. Second, another aspect of decision rights is the frequency of meetings between the owners and managers of enterprises. This aspect will be addressed from a long-term contract perspective as well as a loss aversion perspective.
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Paper provided by Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam. in its series Research Paper with number
ERS-2003-007-ORG Revision_Date: 2009-07-29.
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