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The Rise and Fall of Elites: A Theory of Economic Development and Social Polarization in Rent-Seeking Societies

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Author Info
Ades, A.
Verdier, T.

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Abstract

This paper analyzes how political institutions, wealth distribution and economic activities affect each other during the process of development. A simple general equilibrium model of rent-seeking political elites with two productive sectors (modern and traditional) is presented.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) in its series DELTA Working Papers with number 96-13.

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Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:del:abcdef:96-13

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Related research
Keywords: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POLITICS; GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General

Cited by:
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  1. Christophe Ehrhart, 2009. "The effects of inequality on growth: a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature," Working Papers 107, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality. [Downloadable!]
  2. Joan Esteban & Debraj Ray, 2006. "Inequality, Lobbying, and Resource Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 257-279, March. [Downloadable!]
  3. Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James A, 1999. "A Theory of Political Transitions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2277, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-6.

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