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Capital Movements and the Political Economy of trade Policy

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Delfim Gomes Neto

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Abstract

Considering a time consistent policy in a two-period political economy model of trade policy, where foreign capital is endogenously determined, the tariff and the level of foreign capital would be higher with external debt than with foreign direct investment. As foreign direct investment is remunerated at the marginal productivity of capital, an increase of the tariff increases its remuneration, increasing also the welfare costs of the tariff. Foreign direct investment can lead to free trade.

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Paper provided by DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) in its series DELTA Working Papers with number 2002-01.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:del:abcdef:2002-01

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  1. J. Peter Neary, 1995. "Factor Mobility and International Trade," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(s1), pages 4-23, November.
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  2. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Rama, Martin & Tabellim, Guido, 1998. "Lobbying by capital and labor over trade and labor market policies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(7), pages 1295-1316, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Francisco Rodriguez & Dani Rodrik, 1999. "Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic's Guide to the Cross-national Evidence," Electronic Working Papers 99-003, University of Maryland, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Francisco Rodriguez & Dani Rodrik, 1999. "Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic's Guide to Cross-National Evidence," NBER Working Papers 7081, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Neary, Peter & Ruane, Frances P, 1988. "International Capital Mobility, Shadow Prices, and the Cost of Protection," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(4), pages 571-85, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Hillman, Arye L, 1982. "Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1180-87, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Brecher, Richard A. & Findlay, Ronald, 1983. "Tariffs, foreign capital and national welfare with sector-specific factors," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3-4), pages 277-288, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Saint Paul, Gilles & Verdier, Thierry, 1997. " Power, Distributive Conflicts, and Multiple Growth Paths," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 155-68, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Emily Blanchard, 2006. "Reevaluating the Role of Trade Agreements: Does Investment Globalization Make the WTO Obsolete?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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